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CENTRAL

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BULLETIN

USAF review(s) completed.



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
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
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
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Congo: The transfer of Gizenga to Leopoldville will make it more difficult for Adoula to remove him from the political scene. Adoula apparently had hoped to consign him to oblivion in Stanleyville following his detention last week, but yielded to pressure from the UN and the Orientale provincial government, which were concerned over the security problems presented by his presence there. Gizenga now is in the protective custody of the UN, and UN chief Linner told an American official that he would be turned over to the Congolese Government whenever the latter requested it. Although Gizenga's political ineptitude doubtless is evident even to his former supporters, he still would be useful to them as a symbol of radical Congolese nationalism if they can resolve the factionalism which is currently

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[weakening their position] He apparently is also still supported by at least one of his former international backers; the government-controlled press in Ghana has appealed to "brother Adoula" to retain his ex-deputy, [] and Nkrumah reportedly has sent a telegram to Adoula, warning the premier not to take stringent action against Gizenga. []

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Indonesia: President Sukarno's replacement of the left-leaning Marshal Suryadarma as air force chief of staff by Colonel Umar Dani, the former air operations chief, is probably intended to place the air force under more competent leadership in anticipation of joint operations in connection with West New Guinea. Long in disfavor with the army and navy chiefs of staff and with his own officer corps as uncooperative and incompetent, Suryadarma has been rumored for over a year to have lost presidential support. He was criticized by the other services for the lack of air cover for the Indonesian boats involved in the 15 January clash with the Dutch. Colonel Umar Dani is US-trained, has an anti-Communist reputation, and is well-regarded by the other service chiefs, with whom he can be expected to cooperate. His appointment will not affect the Indonesian Air Force's policy of large-scale purchases from the bloc.

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Djakarta continues to be receptive to efforts by Acting Secretary General U Thant to arrange negotiations between Indonesia and the Dutch on West New Guinea. []

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Venezuela: []

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[] prepared to deal firmly with pro-Cuban leftist groups planning disturbances to protest the meeting of foreign ministers in

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Uruguay on the Cuban issue. Although the situation in Caracas is described as tense, President Betancourt has advised the US chargé that the top military and key garrisons are loyal and that his regime is not in danger. Strike violence in San Cristobal on 18 January, which resulted in a number of casualties, was apparently connected with the current political unrest.

Subversive plans of rightist and leftist opposition groups may be timed to exploit the recent split in the President's Democratic Action party--a development which will tend to weaken the prestige and strength of the two-party governing coalition.

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West Indies: Leaders of Barbados and the Leeward and Windward Islands are planning to form a federation and to seek independence this year. They have rejected Trinidad's bid to join a unitary Trinidad state and are discussing their plans with Colonial Secretary Maudling, now visiting the area. The eight islands involved have unviable economies and will be looking for aid from Britain, Canada, and especially the United States

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London will probably welcome the arrangement in principle as contributing to political and economic stability. Barbados may still try to follow Jamaica and Trinidad toward separate independence if it is not allowed to dominate this proposed federation.

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*East Germany: New measures to enhance its appearance of sovereignty and to put a "legal" end to the still existing economic union between East and West Germany by designating East Germany's boundaries--including the Berlin sector border--as state frontiers will probably be enacted by the East German People's Chamber at its meeting on 24 January. The regime has announced that the agenda for the meeting includes among other

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Items "a bill on customs duties in the GDR."

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The effect of a new customs law probably would be to apply East German customs controls to West German goods transiting East Germany enroute to West Berlin or the Soviet Bloc and goods being delivered in East Germany or East Berlin in order to underline the East German position that West Berlin is not a part of West Germany. Goods destined for the three Western occupying powers presumably would not be effected until the signing of a peace treaty.

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*Bulgaria/Italy: A MIG-17 flown by a Bulgarian pilot crash landed south of Bari in Italy during daylight on 20 January. The aircraft made a wheels-up landing in a wooded area and was badly damaged but there was no fire. A US Air Force officer who approached within five feet of the plane after the crash reported no evidence of photographic equipment. He reported gun sights which may have been mistaken for a photo lens and could have stimulated the press stories that it was a photo reconnaissance aircraft.

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The reported absence of photo equipment and the location of the crash site, beyond the range from which the aircraft could readily have returned to a Bulgarian base without external fuel tanks, suggest that the pilot was not on a directed mission. Official sources have not yet reported the reason for the crash landing.

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*OAS: In an effort to resolve sharp differences between the delegations over action against the Castro regime, the

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[E]ighth Meeting of OAS Foreign Ministers postponed its first public working session to 23 January. The ceremonial opening is to be held as scheduled on 22 January. Opposition to strong anti-Castro action, including sanctions, appears to be led by Brazil.]

[C]uban President Dorticos stopped en route to Uruguay on 20 January for a one-hour meeting with Brazilian President Goulart. Goulart then reaffirmed Brazil's position toward Cuba and Dorticos stated that Cuba intends to remain within "the American community." Dorticos is believed to have been made head of the delegation instead of the vitriolic Foreign Minister Roa because Dorticos is more able to present an appearance of "reasonableness."]

[B]razil appears to expect support from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Mexico and possibly Uruguay.]

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[I]n Bolivia a recent cabinet reshuffle was apparently prompted by President Paz' refusal to take a strong pro-Cuba position for the conference but Paz is probably unwilling to risk a strong anti-Castro stand. Bolivia's politically powerful national labor confederation has scheduled pro-Cuba demonstrations for 22 January in the country's two principal cities.]

[T]he Chilean foreign minister informed the American Embassy in Santiago on 18 January that Chile's opening statement would be the most anti-Communist of all. He warned that Chile would not accept economic sanctions against Cuba but said Chile was prepared to propose informally and "certainly to support" any proposal that Cuba be expelled from the OAS.]

[I]n Ecuador, leftist President Arosemena may be shaken in his pro-Cuba position by extensive anti-Communist rallies.]

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in several cities. At least 35,000 including leaders of almost all political parties demonstrated on 20 January despite a government prohibition.

(Mexico has consistently indicated opposition to OAS imposition of sanctions

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(The Uruguayan executive--a nine-man council--is apparently still undecided on its position.)

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Venezuelan Government Concerned Over Plans
Of Opposition Groups

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[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

An exiled colonel involved in a number of rightist movements to overthrow Betancourt was arrested when he returned to Venezuela on 15 January, and at least three other officers of lesser rank have been apprehended on suspicion of plotting against the government. However, Betancourt's confidence in the continuing loyalty of the armed forces seems justified by their demonstrated support of his regime on numerous occasions since his inauguration in early 1959, and by the sharp decline in the subversive potential of military and other rightist dissidents.

The mid-January split in the Democratic Action (AD), Venezuela's largest party, which is joined with the Christian Democratic (COPEI) party in the governing coalition, appears to be a more serious problem to the regime than rightist plotting. The two factions in the AD--Betancourt's "old guard" and the more leftist elements--held separate national conventions earlier this month. Each faction claimed to be the legitimate party authority and expelled the leaders of the opposing group from the party. This was the culmination of a long-smouldering struggle for power which included differences over ideology, foreign policy, and government reform measures.

The seriousness of the AD split will depend largely on the amount of rank-and-file support which the dissident faction can drain away from the "old guard," which dominates top government positions held by the AD and largely controls patronage and party finances. In addition, the "old guard" has the firm

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support of the leadership of the country's principal labor organization as well as that of its coalition partner.

If the AD dissidents decide to cooperate with opposition leftist-Communist groups, these combined forces could pose a major obstacle to the government's legislative programs, its strong anti-Castro and pro-Western foreign policies, and the maintenance of public order. The Venezuelan Communist party, which has attempted for some time to promote a split in the AD, has reportedly conducted preliminary negotiations on antigovernment activities with leaders of the AD dissidents.

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